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Article
Exploring the Backstage: 
Preparation and 
Implementation of Mass 
Protests in Germany
Dieter Rucht1
Abstract
This article aims to shed light on the understudied backstage of mass street protest 
preparation and implementation. In this article, I present an exploratory framework 
for systematizing the basic tasks and challenges of organizing a mass protest in the 
streets or other places. I elaborate on the concept of backstage and provide an 
overview of the basic tasks and challenges in preparing and organizing mass protest. 
These tasks are fleshed out with empirical support in the article, followed by some 
concluding remarks.
Keywords
NGO, preparation, protest
Introduction
When a dozen or so protesters with a few handmade signs take to the streets, we may 
rightly assume the action required limited preparation—that it was not such hard work. 
To be sure, these people likely needed a prior agreement about when and where to 
show up, and maybe how to articulate their claims. They may have also needed to 
obtain a permit from local officials to stage their protest demonstration. Still, the 
investment in a small-scale collective action of this kind is relatively low. It may be 
even lower in the case of an individual asking his/her Facebook friends or Twitter 
followers to join a flash mob. Yet preparatory work is a completely different matter 
when it comes to orchestrating a protest that brings tens or hundreds of thousands of 
people onto the streets.
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Considering the importance of the streets as a long-standing site of contentious 
gatherings, it is puzzling how little attention external observers are giving to the work 
that goes into preparing and enacting mass public protests these days. Regardless of 
whether digital technologies are lowering the costs of mobilization, if direct participa-
tion is losing ground to professional management or even industry-management 
(Walker, 2014) in Western democracies, and although protest is sometimes unorga-
nized, we should pay more attention to what is entailed in coordinating mass public 
demonstrations. Doing so is not onerous. Core organizers can, for instance, provide 
extensive lists of prior activities. These lists include countless phone calls; numerous 
meetings with potential contributors and donors; challenging discussions among 
organizing individuals and groups about the right place and time for the event, its 
form(s) of protest, key slogans, the wording of flyers; organizing the erection of a 
stage and sound system as well as the speakers and performers on stage; accepting or 
rejecting restrictions levied by authorities; organizing a press conference before the 
event; negotiating with the police on the spot; and so on. In short, organizing mass 
protest is an enterprise in its own right. This enterprise, as a rule, requires material 
resources, experience, know-how, talent, endurance, and, above all, time.
The importance of organization and resources in mobilizing large groups of people 
is not new to social movement scholars. In the second half of the 1970s, resource 
mobilization theory began directing scholarship on collective action to the idea that 
movement activities are largely rooted in an organizational fabric wherein resources 
channeled through social movement organizations (SMOs) and movement “entrepre-
neurs” play a crucial role (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Despite becoming a cornerstone 
of social movement theorizing, few empirical studies were undertaken to demonstrate 
the actual requirements and processes of organizing protest (cf. Edwards & McCarthy, 
2004). What insights we do have come largely from case studies of particular move-
ments where organizing activities are treated as one factor among others or from case 
studies focused on a particular public protest event (i.e., possibly emphasizing its 
media resonance, framing of certain demands, or some form of official response) 
rather than the preparatory work that made it happen. Accordingly, social scientists, 
journalists, and the wider public audience tend to have scant knowledge of what work 
is going on behind the scenes during large-scale protest events as well as in the weeks, 
months, and sometimes years preceding such events.1
This article aims to shed light on the understudied backstage of mass street protest 
preparation and implementation. Although the evidence used here comes mainly from 
select cases of mass protests in Germany over the past few decades, the findings can 
be applied more broadly. For one, organizers of mass protest face similar basic 
challenges in all Western democracies, despite some variation in terms of the relative 
strength and organizational styles of preexisting SMOs, the rights of assembly, law 
enforcement systems, and performative protest cultures. Second, the reference cases in 
this article vary in the type of issue, claims, and form. They include rallies, marches, 
and acts of civil disobedience, as well as isolated events and those a part of coordi-
nated campaigns of parallel or sequential actions. Third, selecting reference cases 
from the 1980s to the present (2017) allows for the study of changes over time in the 
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ways mass protests are organized. That said, the cases I consider here are limited to 
mass protests in the streets, thereby sidelining other forms of mass protest, such as 
participation in official referenda, riots, consumer boycotts, telephoning representatives, 
petitions, or electoral rallies. When compared to all protests, mass protests in the 
streets or other public spaces are infrequent.2 There is no commonly agreed minimum 
threshold for calling a protest a mass protest.3 To me, it starts with a thousand or a few 
thousand participants but has no upper limit. I deliberately keep the lower threshold 
somewhat flexible to account for different contexts, forms, and expectations. A protest 
of 2,000 demonstrators in a big capital city, for example, may be considered tiny, while 
the same number in a small city can appear as a “mass.” In a similar vein, 1,000 
protesters engaged in blocking a highway can seem large, but the same number might 
be seen as very small at a rally organized by a trade union with several million members. 
In Germany, the greatest share of mass street protests, especially those with tens of 
thousands of participants and beyond, recruit from the progressive left or left-liberal 
side of the political spectrum. Mass protests representing the conservative side of the 
spectrum (e.g., on issues of homosexuality and abortion) are infrequent and, contrary 
to France and other countries, relatively small. These demonstrations rarely involve 
more than a few thousand people taking to the street. Right-wing populist protests 
(also involving right radicals) peaked twice with participant numbers ranging from 
15,000 to 20,000. Since the end of World War II, street protests by groups that can be 
clearly classified as radical right or racist have never attracted more than 6,000 
people.
In what follows, I present an exploratory framework for systematizing the basic 
tasks and challenges of organizing a mass protest in the streets or other places. In the 
first section, I elaborate on the concept of backstage and provide an overview of the 
basic tasks and challenges in preparing and organizing mass protest. These tasks are 
fleshed out with empirical support in the subsequent sections, followed by some 
concluding remarks. The analysis is empirically based on several sources: my own 
observations of protest events during the past decades, sometimes including participant 
observation in preparatory meetings; five semistructured interviews with experienced 
protest organizers carried out in September 2017; and the available literature touching 
on preparation processes, which, as previously noted, is primarily comprised of case 
studies on single protest events or campaigns.
Conceptual Tools
Several conceptual tools used in this article, most importantly meso- and micromobi-
lization and consensus and action mobilization, are already well established in social 
movement studies. As such, these well-established concepts are only briefly described 
in the subsequent sections where they play a key role. However, the concept of back-
stage that is mostly used in a casual way in social sciences merits special attention.
Erving Goffman4 introduced the terms frontstage and backstage, used widely in the 
world of theater theretofore, as concepts for understanding the micro level of social 
interaction processes in “real” life. In both the realms of theater and nonfictional life, 
Rucht 1681
the front stage is the place of publicly visible action meant to affect, impress, or enter-
tain an audience and is therefore the space of (ritualized) performances.
When it comes to mass protests in the streets, organizers often literally use a physical 
stage as a focal point so that the audience can better see the speakers, moderators, 
musicians, and even sometimes professional actors. The audience of mass protest is 
not limited to those who are physically present as participants or casual bystanders. 
Particularly in the case of large-scale gatherings, the audience includes, and is meant 
to include, those who see the protest through the mass media. Through the mass media, 
the demonstration can potentially reach millions of additional people or even create 
the impression that the whole world is watching (Gitlin, 1980).
Directly related to this literal frontstage is a literal backstage. The back of the stage 
at mass demonstrations are often hidden behind a curtain crossing the platform or hidden 
in one or more tents (or trucks) on the ground level behind the stage. On this back-
stage, invisible personnel—people handling urgent messages, blocking unwanted 
“fans,” and talking to police officers, as well as sound technicians, speakers, and musi-
cians waiting for their performances—are actively working for a few hours or a full 
day to facilitate the frontstage performance and ensure the backstage remains behind 
the scenes. Although this backstage at protest events merits scholarly study, it is not 
the focus of this article. Instead, I explore another kind of back stage, which, for the 
sake of clarity, I call the prep stage.
The term prep stage is a metaphorical catchphrase for the ensemble of processes, 
structures, and actors that precede and make possible the actual protest event. As such, 
the prep stage is not a single physical place, but consists of a series of encounters and 
communications of various people and groups who engage in the process of preparing 
a single protest or a broader protest campaign and tend to meet in different places. This 
process may take a few days or last for 1 or 2 years. It is, for the most part, invisible to 
the larger public and even to the mass of activists and potential protesters who are 
targeted in the later steps of this process. This is not to say that all meetings, delibera-
tions, and mediated forms of communication are closed shops. Some preparatory 
groups are very open, actively inviting constituents to join certain meetings.
Furthermore, when social movements and movement families are long-standing, 
one can identify a third kind of backstage. This is a deeper backstage composed of the 
ensemble of more permanent structures (e.g., social movement organizations, media 
groups, educational centers, sympathizing scientific advisers, and lawyers) that are not 
geared toward the preparation of a specific protest but rather represent a pool of poten-
tial resources and institutions that can be tapped by prep stage actors. In order to avoid 
confusion, I refer to these more permanent structures that may serve mobilization for 
multiple issues as the movement infrastructure.
Mass street protest is mostly preceded by lengthy and laborious preparatory work, 
hence the existence of a complex prep stage that tends to be buttressed by a more per-
manent movement infrastructure. There are, however, notable exceptions. In certain 
instances, mass protests emerge as an immediate, spontaneous response to a triggering 
event that many people perceive as outrageous. Take, for example, the fatal shooting 
of an unarmed student demonstrator, Benno Ohnesorg, by a policeman in civilian 
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clothing during a protest against the Shah of Iran’s state visit to Berlin on June 2, 1967. 
This act—an act the authorities flatly denied at first and then grossly misrepresented—
provoked students and other left and liberal groups to take to the streets. While the 
initial protests opposing the Shah’s visit in several cities were preplanned and directed 
primarily by a Berlin-based umbrella group of Persian dissidents living in Germany 
(CIS/NU), almost no preparatory work went into the mass protests that arose and 
accelerated in the wake of Ohnesorg’s death. In the week following the incident, more 
than 100,000 people, mostly students, participated in various protests across Germany 
(Wesel, 2002).
Another striking departure from the general rule of intensive preparatory work is 
evident in the so-called “candle-light chains” (Lichterketten) against right-wing 
xenophobia that formed in the streets of many German towns and cities in winter 
1992/1993. In the Bavarian capital of Munich, on December 6, 1992, approximately 
400,000 people came together to demonstrate their opposition to various violent and 
sometimes deadly attacks directed at asylum seekers and other migrants. Unlike the 
Ohnesorg case, these mass gatherings were not an immediate, spontaneous reaction to 
a specific trigger event. By contrast, they resulted from gradually growing public concern 
about a rising trend in hate-driven political violence against refugees over the preced-
ing months. In the Munich demonstration, four or five individuals not directly linked 
to preexisting protest groups, well-known journalists among them, took the initiative 
of calling for a nonhierarchical, highly symbolic mass public gathering—without 
speakers or banners, just with people carrying lights in the dark of an early December 
evening—only 4 days in advance. For this kind of mass action, neither physical infra-
structure (e.g., a stage or loudspeakers) nor networking among existing organizations, 
such as civil rights groups, religious congregations, trade unions, or political parties, 
were necessary. Instead, the absence of any domineering organization, combined with 
the fact that initiating journalists held direct access to mass media conduits for launching 
the call, and a public primed to do something about the issue, appear to have made this 
call attractive and effective.
Turning to the class of “regular” cases of mass public protests, I identify a limited 
number of basic tasks and challenges confronting the initiators and organizers of mass 
protest. As the following sections will show, these tasks overlap in both substance and 
timing. However, for the sake of analytical clarity, they are identified as separate 
clusters and then described in general terms alongside case examples in which they are 
evident. The tentative list presents seven basic preparatory tasks or steps:
•• Mesomobilization 1: The formation of core organizers
•• Mesomobilization 2: Building an organizational structure
•• Mobilizing financial resources
•• Clarifying the specificities of the event
•• Consensus and action mobilization
•• Media work
•• During and after the protest event
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Mesomobilization 1: The Formation of Core Organizers
As with other forms of protest, the idea to launch a mass street protest primarily comes 
from an individual or small group identifying some social or political problem requiring 
state authorities, the broader public, and/or some other decision-makers to recognize 
and redress. Protest initiators often seek to persuade as many people as possible to take 
part in a coordinated public action because other means of influencing the decisions of 
a target (e.g., lobbying or financing a costly professional advertising campaign) are 
unavailable or deemed inappropriate. Mass protest efforts, however, routinely follow 
a “power of numbers” logic of influence (DeNardo, 1985), according to the motto “the 
more the better.” And, indeed, both movement scholars and practitioners see the number 
of protest participants as crucial for gaining attention and bringing about change. 
Almost always, the initial move to initiate a mass protest comes not from novices, but 
from experienced organizers with an understanding of the necessary tasks and means 
for achieving this end. In some of these instances, protest preparation and sources for 
participants are anchored in a single organization, that is, a large trade union, a nation-
wide network such as the antinuclear ausgestrahlt in Germany, or a multitiered, 
national organization like the Sierra Club in the United States. In many other cases, 
though, mass protest organizers attempt to involve a range of groups and organizations 
in preparation process. Despite inevitable coordinating hassles, such protest coalitions 
or “event coalitions” (Staggenborg, 2015) enable expertise and cost sharing in the 
preparatory process,5 and ultimately, the mobilization of many more people than what 
a single group can achieve.
Especially in the early stages of large-scale public protest preparation, the main 
effort is on mesomobilization (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). That is, bringing together 
preexisting activist groups, organizations, or networks in which individuals are embedded 
rather than directly mobilizing individuals (on micromobilization; see Ward, 2015). 
Mesomobilization, at least for large and/or complex mass protests, occurs over several 
stages. First, it implies setting up a core group to develop a rough idea about the envis-
aged protest. Next, there may be an effort to enlarge the core group by involving 
groups that actively participate in defining the specificities of the planned protest 
event and sharing the burden and cost of the preparatory work. Third, usually at the 
late stage when most of the planning and preparatory work is done, additional groups 
are contacted to join the bandwagon; that is, to be listed among the nominal support-
ers, help to create the image of a broad alliance, and, hopefully, try to mobilize their 
own constituency.
The core group tends to play a crucial role throughout the whole process. Sometimes 
it is a routinized group that has already been around for several years with little 
fluctuation in membership. Sometimes it is a newly composed group or committee, 
especially when it comes to new issues or new (or rarely used) forms of protest. These 
core bodies nominally operate according to egalitarian principles even when the mem-
bers come from formal organizations that differ largely in terms of resources. 
Unsurprisingly and given differences in what groups can contribute, closer examina-
tion typically reveals an informal hierarchy existing from the very start or emerging 
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early on. Those actors who represent groups with more resources, more experience, 
and a more formal decision-making structures frequently occupy a higher status or a 
de facto leadership role in the committee than smaller or less coherent groups with 
only modest mobilization capacities and, probably also, with difficulties speaking in 
one voice. But there are also coordinating bodies that more strongly adhere to the 
principles of grassroots organization and internal democracy. This applies especially 
for the antinuclear network x-tausendmal quer and, more recently, the network Ende 
Gelände, which opposes the surface mining of brown coal. Both single-issue networks 
have organized mass acts of civil disobedience by occupying streets or production 
facilities. With regard to major campaigns, a coordination group and an explicit internal 
division of labor are set up.
Of course, there are different ways to set up and run a coordinating body for a single 
event or campaign coalition. One option is to establish a kind of quasi-parliament 
composed of selected members or delegates of preexisting groups. This body then 
discusses and decides on all matters it deems relevant for organizing the protest. 
Another option is to set up a group of volunteers or paid activists not necessarily 
belonging to or representing a particular organization. Here, the group is commonly 
charged with accomplishing more mundane facilitation work (e.g., negotiating prizes 
for advertisement or organizing bus rides), while strategic decisions and fundamental 
substantive matters (such as the wording of key demands) remain in the hands of the 
allied organizations. A third option is handing coordination over to one single—
usually powerful—preexisting organization. As only one organization takes the lead 
in the preparatory process, this option is rarely chosen because other supporting groups 
also want to have a say. Whatever specific form coordinating and networking organizers 
takes, rudimentary coordination processes are key to preparing the ground for a mass 
protest. These early coordination requirements are essentially the same: forming a 
decision-making body to determine the date, location, basic form, and major rationale 
of the protest. Only after this foundation is clear will the first step protest entrepre-
neurs stand a reasonable chance of including or activating other preexisting groups 
and networks—collectivities that either stood apart or were deliberately kept outside 
during this first step.
Mesomobilization 2: Building an Organizational Structure
Once a rudimentary template for coordinating the preparatory work necessary to 
achieve the basic protest idea is in place or has sufficiently started to emerge on a 
somewhat ad hoc basis, there is the challenge of developing it into a directed organi-
zational structure. This could be seen as a second step of mesomobilization. It 
critically produces a Trägerkreis (circle of supporters) or Koordinierungsgruppe 
(coordination group) accountable for ensuring the remaining stages are fleshed out and 
seen through. Starting with expanding the organizational base, convincing additional 
groups to step in and, hopefully, take an active role in one or several dimensions of the 
preparatory work depends on many things. Sometimes groups not involved thus far 
are invited to “buy” into an almost ready-made package of planned mass protest. This 
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type of situation may result from a deliberate decision by the core group of initiators 
to reduce the transaction costs of a potentially cumbersome and conflict-ridden delib-
eration on fundamental aspects of the event. Thus, for example, a foundation related to 
one of the political parties that joins the existing platform are given little opportunity 
to influence the shape of the event. In other cases, especially when the actual event is 
not yet well defined or when powerful potential allies attach strings to their participation, 
the preparatory processes are kept more open and flexible. This allows late-joiners to 
more strongly identify with and probably contribute more to the organizational work 
and mobilizing efforts.
The coinciding subtask at this stage of planning is to create some sort of division of 
labor within the mesomobilization network. This entails specifying and attributing 
specific roles to certain groups and individuals. As long as this has not already emerged 
in a more or less organic way, now is the time to think about the range of tasks, how 
they shall be dealt with, and who will be accountable. To oversee this work, the 
Trägerkreis circle of key organizers can be solidified or even formalized. These core 
organizational representatives may be formally responsible for and committed to 
ensuring that specific tasks are completed, resources delivered as promised, and con-
flicts resolved. One can generally assume that the more ambitious the expected mass 
protest—its size, complexity, novelty, and so on—the more explicit and refined the 
division of labor. With regard to medium-sized protests, particularly those planned on 
relatively short notice, the division of labor is likely to be simpler so that one person 
or a small group is assigned several duties and improvisation may be needed. However, 
the idea that an outstanding movement leader would be able to handle all these pro-
cesses is unrealistic (Rucht, 2012). Even more so, a meticulously planned and orches-
trated mass protest is likely to rest on an elaborated division of labor and strategic 
reasoning (King & Walker, 2014).
Comparing across a number of mass protests organized in the past 15 years or so in 
Germany, a relatively stable structure for organizing mass protests appears to have 
arisen. This holds most notably for organizations addressing policy issues that bear a 
family resemblance to one another, such as energy, environmental protection, agricul-
ture, and, more recently, international trade. The inner circle of the mesomobilization 
structure is made up of representatives from several big environmental organizations 
(BUND, Nabu, Greenpeace, and occasionally the WWF), the multi-issue organization 
Attac, sometimes various trade unions, and the largely web-based campaign group 
Campact.6 Basically, the same set of organizations has worked together for years 
(Kaul, 2001). This prior coalition experience makes them pragmatic, efficient, and 
adaptable. More specifically, having discussed principal matters of planning together 
and learning from various mobilizations, they have a developed a solid framework for 
dividing labor among themselves. For instance, one member of the NaturFreunde usu-
ally manages permit procedures and serves as the named applicant (Anmelder) for 
mass protests. Another member of the preparatory core group, sometimes with a col-
league or two, is responsible for drafting a call to action, which is then iteratively 
discussed by other members before eventually serving as the basis for the protest mes-
sage—a message that will be conveyed in flyers, online, and through various other 
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media. Before this message goes out, it is approved or tacitly accepted by all relevant 
support groups listed as members of the Trägerkreis. Other consistently needed, specific 
tasks are similarly assigned to one or more people of the inner circle of organizers. 
This notably includes mobilizing other groups, drafting a budget plan, and selecting 
the channels for publicizing the forthcoming protest.
The structure of networks that strongly endorse grassroots organizing combined 
with disruptive, strictly nonviolent protest forms is similar to the one seen among large 
and mostly formal organizations. This is especially true for the antinuclear network 
x-tausendmal quer and the overlapping group ausgestrahlt. More recently, the net-
work Ende Gelände formed to oppose the surface mining of brown coal. A coordinating 
group with an explicit internal division of labor is usually set up in both kinds of net-
works to prepare major protests. These coordination bodies may include up to 20 peo-
ple engaging in several months of preparatory work. Most of the coordinators are 
volunteers who, at best, are reimbursed for their travel costs. They communicate and 
deliberate in both telephone conferences and in physical meetings. Both networks 
have organized mass acts of civil disobedience by occupying streets or production 
facilities.
Finally, groups on the radical left spectrum occasionally try to stage mass pro-
tests. They do so either entirely on their own (e.g., on Mayday, in reaction to police 
raids evicting squatters, etc.) or in the context of mass protests organized by the 
more moderate coordinating bodies described above. In the latter case, this form of 
“spin-off” collective action often provokes strong critique from the more estab-
lished, initiating organizations that fear for their own credibility, especially when 
the radicals turn violent. The international summits of political leaders (G7, G8, 
G20) are notable as occasions where moderate and radical progressive strands 
engaged in parallel and sometimes loosely coordinated protests. The prep stage 
activities of far left radicals are largely unknown. What is clear is that they have 
more limited financial resources.
Mobilizing Financial Resources
Most mass public protests cannot be prepared and implemented without major financial 
expenditures, but there are always some exceptions. Protests announced in response to 
widespread public uncertainty or unsettling trigger-events, when emotions are running 
high and the urgency of taking action is extreme, do not demand large financial out-
lays. Under such conditions, a call for protest may resonate broadly with the mass 
public and thereby attract large numbers of people without much prior, deliberate pre-
paratory work, or financial investment.7 Mobilization, in these instances, relies more 
on people informally spreading the word in conversation, on large organizations sending 
messages to their members, or on the mass media positively reporting on the forth-
coming event, than it relies on the financial resources of big movement organizations. 
The utility of tapping into issues that are already on media agendas is evident in the 
previously mentioned 1992 candle-light chain demonstration in Munich. The financial 
investment was probably close to nothing in this unusual case.
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Moreover, some forms mass protests by their nature do not require a costly material 
infrastructure. Take the example of human chains in which masses of protesters 
physically link places of symbolic and material relevance. As recently as 2017, a 
human protest chain linked some 50,000 people across the 80 kilometers from the 
German city of Aachen to Maastricht in the Netherlands to the nuclear reactor 
Tihange in Belgium.8 In 2010, 120,000 protesters linked two outdated nuclear reactors 
over a distance of 120 kilometers in Northern Germany. And, further illustrating the 
human chain as a “modular” repertoire for effective but inexpensive collective 
action, about 200,000 people protested against the nuclear arms race by forming a 
human chain stretching from Ulm to Stuttgart in October of 1983. Activities of this 
scope definitely require a hard-working coordinating team, planning, and a great 
deal of time from many volunteers. Nevertheless, these chains required relatively 
little money. In line with protests responding to highly salient issues, contentious 
performances or tactics that are routinized and demand little material infrastructure, 
large financial outlays are also less necessary when it comes to annual protest events 
that are part of commemoration and collective memory. Consider the annual Mayday 
march in Berlin organized by radical leftist activists and others in the past few 
decades. This event, which rivals the morning trade union protest, starts at 6 p.m. 
and attracts up to 20,000 people. Because it is basically the same procedure every 
year, there is no pressing need to publicize the event, though there are calls on political 
websites and posters in the main neighborhoods of action. Furthermore, apart from 
a truck carrying a microphone, amplifiers, and loudspeakers, not much more is 
required in terms of hardware.
The conditions that limit the need for significant financial resources should be 
bracketed because the majority of mass street protests are costly enterprises. From the 
viewpoint of organizers, financing significantly influences the participant turnout. As 
I was told in conversations with organizers 10 or 15 years ago, a mass rally in Germany 
attracting several tens of thousands of participants typically required an investment of 
several tens of thousands of Euros. This rule of thumb—that the numerical turnout 
matches the financial investment—still applies to a number of more recent cases. 
Importantly, though, the amount of financial investment, calculated in relation to the 
number of participants, can be significantly higher and is trending in this direction. In 
part, higher costs reflect rising expectations as to which protest events really matter for 
both potential participants and the mass media. Accordingly, the average ratio of one 
Euro per participant may be steadily increasing to a ratio of two or more Euros per 
capita. This appears to have been the case in the April 2016 mass street demonstration 
in Hannover against the TTIP (U.S.-European countries) and Ceta (Canada-European 
countries) free trade agreement plans. Between 35,000 people (according to some 
media accounts) and 90,000 people (according to the organizers) took to the streets, 
while the financial investment across the 20 organizations supporting the event was 
around 150,000 Euros.
Clearly, some forms of protest require a bigger investment of monetary and 
nonmonetary resources than an average rally. Take, for example, the most recent campaign 
of the network Ende Gelände in 2017. In addition to organizing a more conventional, 
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low-risk rally with several thousand participants, the campaign facilitated a “red line” 
of higher risk collective actions. The red line included a human chain with 3,500 
participants. Moreover, the network organized three summer camps and several peaceful 
blockades of up to 1,200 protesters at a brown coal surface mining site over an 
extended weekend. In contrast to a short rally, such campaigns accrue significant addi-
tional costs for renting big tents, field kitchens, water and waste containers, toilets, and 
so on. Relative to approximately 6,000 participants across the various kinds of actions, 
the financial expenditure of between 80,000 and 90,000 Euros was extraordinarily 
high.
To date, the most expensive—though not the biggest—mass demonstrations in 
Germany took place on September 17, 2016, against the planned TTIP and Ceta free 
trade agreements. According to the organizers, 320,000 people in total participated in 
the rallies held in seven cities, but a handful of independent observers reported a 
significantly lower turnout.9 Whatever the exact number of participants, the expenses 
were substantially higher than the one-to-one ratio, the old rule of thumb, would 
anticipate. Key organizers said that the overall investment in the seven rallies was 
close to one million Euros, almost half of which came from Campact (see below). A 
large proportion of the money was spent on paid labor in the preparatory process, 
including setting up offices with paid staffs in each of the seven cities to prepare the 
local protest. Another large chunk of the budget went to material infrastructure for the 
event itself (i.e., big stages, sound systems, truck-mounted video screens to visualize 
the action on stage, the travel and lodging expenses of invited speakers, the distribution 
of standardized banners and flags to participants, crowd stewards, etc.).
While this dispersed, 1-day protest was carefully planned and financed by big 
organizations,10 networks of small and medium-sized groups with modest resources 
are also capable of organizing large-scale street demonstrations. Take the example of 
a rally against welfare cuts and unemployment in Berlin on November 1, 2003. To the 
surprise of its organizers who could only invest a small sum of money, the event 
attracted around 100,000 participants. The high turnout also came as a surprise to the 
major trade union leaders who chose not to collaborate on the event, though some 
local sections participated. Based on this experience, the trade unions opted to join the 
next big event. Moreover, they took an active role in the preparatory process and covered 
the bulk of the financial expenses. In the end, on April 3, 2004, mass rallies were held 
in the cities of Stuttgart, Cologne, and Berlin with a total participation of around 
500,000 people of which roughly half were mobilized in Berlin. This was probably the 
largest protest event on social and welfare issues in postwar German history. While 
both events described above can be seen as successful in terms of attendance, the prep 
stage of the April 2004 protest was fraught with internal tensions and dismay among 
the majority of organizing groups. These groups felt that the trade unions leveraged 
their substantial financial contribution to dominate the shape of the actions, to dominate 
how the actions appeared to the public through their press contacts, and to ultimately 
position themselves as the main contributors in the eyes of the public. Although the 
success of the small group networks in the 2003 event is what brought the large trade 
unions to the table for the 2004 event coalition, their marginalization in the latter event 
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diminished their readiness for future coalition activities with more powerful 
organizations.
Against this backdrop, it was probably no accident that the next wave of mass 
protest around similar social issues took a substantially different form. When the 
national parliament continued its austerity policy by passing the Hartz IV bill, a massive 
program to reduce unemployment provisions, no further single mass demonstration 
was set in motion. Instead, opposition to the governmental program crystallized in a 
series of weekly, so-called Monday-demonstrations that spread over several hundred 
cities across Germany. This fully decentralized protest wave was set off by the actions 
of a politically inexperienced and unemployed individual. Via a diffusion process 
spurred by mass media reports, individuals and small groups in other cities adopted 
similar actions. Almost no direct coordination went on between the local organizers 
and little to no money was needed to stage a local Monday-demonstration. For some 
initiators, especially in small cities with small turnouts, it was enough to simply 
announce the time and place of the gathering and grab a megaphone or a microphone 
and loudspeaker. In places with greater participation, the loading floor of a small truck 
sufficed as a stage for invited speakers or participants wanting to spontaneously con-
vey a message to the audience. The prevalence of handmade banners and signs speaks 
to the improvised character of these events.
The minimal organizational and financial investment of the Hartz IV Monday 
protest wave closely resembles dynamics seen in later protest campaigns targeting 
other issues. The early phase of the quick-rising, xenophobic right-wing movement 
Pegida, which began in the city of Dresden in late 2014, relied on the pattern of weekly 
Monday demonstrations. Similarly, the pro-European Pulse of Europe movement 
emerged in Frankfurt/Main in late 2016 and engaged in weekly demonstrations, 
usually on Sunday, up to its prime in Spring 2017. These events took place in nearly a 
hundred cities in Germany and two dozen cities abroad.
These two more recent protest campaigns highlight how the Internet and social 
media tools can lower the organizational costs of public mobilizations—at least those 
mobilizations where the numbers of participants are more widely dispersed in space 
and time. As part of the larger over time dynamics in the different work that goes into 
highly centralized mass protest events where demonstrators converge on one location 
to highly dispersed, more high-frequency events, many of the underlying techniques 
(networking, spreading the word, determining the protest form, place, and time) and 
conditioning factors (e.g., media diffusion, modularity) remain relatively stable. 
Clearly, mobilizing financial resources ranks high among the preparatory steps generally 
required for preplanned, large-scale protests that are being considerably altered in the 
face of new digital technologies.
While the pace at which digital technologies are changing makes it difficult to 
predict their precise impact on the preparation and implementation work activists do, 
the interactive nature of protest mobilization has always made predicting and planning 
for the “right” amount of financial resources far from perfect. Protest organizers often 
decide to launch a protest without knowing, at least in the early stages, what the financial 
costs will be and where exactly the money will come from. Moreover, throughout the 
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preparatory process and sometimes even in the days right before the actual event, it is 
sometimes unclear how many people will show up. So both costs and turnout may be 
miscalculated.
Last-minute needs prior to an event can create unexpected additional costs. This is 
exactly what happened at one mass demonstration when a well-known music band 
agreed to perform for free but insisted on the provision of a special sound system that 
generated a considerable, unforeseen expense shortly before the event. Also, if it 
becomes clear that attendance will be much higher than expected in the few weeks or 
days before an event, organizers may decide to install more loudspeakers and large 
video screens. Renting a single truck with a video screen, as was done at the TTIP/
Ceta protests in 2016, costs about 8,000 Euro. Such uncertainty can push organizers to 
request monetary donations from the public before or even during the actual protest. It 
is not rare to see stewards, equipped with paper or plastic boxes, roam through the 
crowd asking participants for money. Organizers confronted with a substantial deficit 
can also try to compensate for it after the event by pressuring the supporting organizations 
to give a greater share than initially planned. In some cases, these groups have already 
agreed in the preparatory process on a deficit guarantee. In others, they may approach 
one or more wealthy individuals who are known to be sympathetic to the common 
cause.
It should come as no surprise then that negotiations and decisions about financing 
are delicate when coalitions contain groups notoriously lacking in such resources. In 
these situations, participating organizations often try to minimize their own financial 
contribution in the hope that other groups or a joint funding campaign can fill any 
gaps. Financial resource planning focuses on three broad, major expense categories: 
(1) paid labor, preferably five or more full-time workers engaged solely on preparatory 
tasks for several months; (2) event media, including advertisements, flyers, brochures, 
posters, and computers; and (3) material or physical infrastructure for the day(s) and 
places of action, such as stage, sound system, and video screen rental, a video crew, 
and security.
Recalling the above-mentioned mass demonstrations in the policy areas of energy, 
agriculture, and international trade, a financing norm has emerged among the main 
organizational players in the past decade or so. The organizations are classifiable into 
three rough categories according to their financial power (which is often related to the 
number of members): big, medium, and small. The financing norm is that groups 
classified as “medium” should contribute around half of the amount given by “big” 
ones, and groups classified “small” are expected to provide half of the amount of 
medium-sized groups. Although attempts to gain financial and other forms of support 
from additional groups utilize this relatively straightforward standard, they are not 
always successful.11 Because the mobilization of financial resources is geared toward 
generating and managing a large event turnout, groups unable to make a financial 
contribution are sometimes welcomed into the coalition circle for other reasons. They 
might, for instance, be able to mobilize many volunteers or expand the range of potential 
demonstrators by representing a distinct ideological strand or complementary area of 
policy debate. However, radical groups do not participate (and are not welcomed) in 
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these kinds of preparatory coalition circles with (formally or informally) standardized 
practices.
When it comes to smaller protests organized by more informal or financially poor 
groups, other ways of covering expenses come into play. One option, one that continues 
to be relatively rare in Germany, is crowdfunding through Internet channels. Another 
option is generating funding through organizations specializing in protest activities. 
For example, the tax-exempt Movement Foundation (Die Bewegungsstiftung) pro-
vides selective support to specific campaigns or protest events. With some overlapping 
personnel, but operational independence, the Civil Courage Fund (Fonds Zivilcourage), 
which is rather an informal circle of donors than an institution, similarly supports acts 
of mass civil disobedience. The Fund awards organizers amounts ranging from 2,500 
to 15,000 Euros per group or activity based on strict requirements, sometimes including 
that the money be paid back after the event.
Processes of financing medium-sized and large-scale mass protests, given their 
frequency when it comes to the moderate left and left-liberal spectrum, have become 
increasingly routinized and professionalized in the past decades. In comparison to 
more ad hoc, limited financing that went into the mass protests of the 1960s, financing 
today’s mass protests is often—but not always—a matter of specific individuals or 
designated coordinating committees handling detailed Excel-tables and considerable 
sums of money. In this context, the mobilization group Campact.de has acquired a key 
role since it came on the scene in 2005. Due to its financial power,12 the network is 
able to initiate major campaigns without much agonizing over financial details. In the 
past few years, this role has become so strong that Campact leaders, concerned about 
upholding principles of democracy and transparency, have decided to contribute only 
up to 50% of the actual costs of any given mass protest. Through this act of self-
limitation, they hope to reduce the risk of dwarfing other participating organizations 
or setting a protest agenda based mainly on financial power.
Clarifying the Specificities of the Event
By this stage of preparation, a rough idea of the planned mass protest is in place (e.g., 
its date, location, basic form, and purpose). Establishing or broadening the network of 
organizing groups and figuring out what financial resources might be available would 
be difficult without this. The event details, however, only tend to become clearer during 
the middle stages of the preparatory process. For them to be clarified, certain questions 
commonly arise: Which group or organization should be named first or made most 
prominent? What are the key slogans and claims? Who are the main targets of political 
critique? Should specific claims be combined with a more fundamental critique of 
society and how should they be conveyed? Who are the main speakers and how much 
time should they each be given? Is there a need for stewards to facilitate the crowd 
and, if so, what are their responsibilities and limits? Should political parties be allowed 
to show their banners? How should potential counter-protesters be handled? Is there a 
need to designate a spokesperson or to organize a press conference for the event? 
Should organizers distribute standardized signs to the protesters?
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While these clarifying questions may appear trivial or purely a matter of organiza-
tional cooperation, they regularly inspire intense debate in group or coalition meetings. 
Sometimes negotiating these points generates internal power struggles and heated 
disputes over strategies, politics, and ideology. Groups may even exit a coalition if 
they feel underrepresented in such meetings or misrepresented by the decisions (e.g., 
that the proposed messages and claims are either too moderate or too radical). Of 
course, certain choices are thornier than others. For instance, the handling of relations 
with political parties has reached a certain level of consensus among mass protest 
entrepreneurs in Germany. In many events, organizers are keen to keep political parties 
at arms-length to maintain their image of autonomy. As a consequence, organizers 
often ban signs and logos of any political party within a distance of 50 or 100 meters 
from the main stage. Organizers also tend to ban leading members of political parties 
from the stage to avoid the risks of appearing partial or irritating sympathizers of other 
political parties.13
When conflicts among coordinating groups go unresolved, dissolution is among 
the possible outcomes. Dissolution can mean a total collapse of the preparatory pro-
cesses, but it can also take forms of more divided actions, such as two separate 
protest events focused on the same problem being organized for the same day or 
within a short period of time. This is what happened several times in Berlin during 
the commemorative Christopher Street Day gay-pride parades, in the marches of 
left-wing groups on Mayday (with separate marches of the trade unions and up to 
three different marches of groups embracing the idea of the “revolutionary” Mayday). 
It also happened in 2004 during a women’s movement protest countering the annual 
“March for Life,” and accounts for some Monday protests to fight unemployment in 
2004. It is no wonder that sympathizers of an ostensibly common cause have diffi-
culties understanding the prep stage rivalries in such cases and therefore struggle to 
decide which band to join.
Negative experiences with protest coalition politics has recently fueled a tendency 
toward coordinating a multiplicity of actions under the umbrella of larger, loosely 
defined campaigns or in response to an easily identifiable triggering event. A prototype 
of this strategic openness developed in campaigns against nuclear waste transports to 
northern Germany (Rucht, 2013). The transport routes themselves carried nuclear 
materials from a reprocessing plant in Western France to Germany on an almost annual 
basis from 1995 to 2011. In response, dozens of organizations and groups began 
engaging in various tactics to block, or at least delay, the transport of these containers 
(on railroad tracks and roads) to the storage site. Apart from a joint mass gathering, 
attended by up to 50,000 protesters at the beginning of the campaign, individual 
protest groups—formal or informal, local or nonlocal, farmers or students—independently 
decided where, when, and how to act. Taken together, these activist groups proffered 
an interesting panorama of different forms of protest: from colorful music perfor-
mances by small, local groups to well-coordinated street blockades or acts of sabotage 
(e.g., weakening the rock bed underneath the railroad tracks). Although the autonomy 
of actions was clearly respected, an implicit consensus to minimize material damage 
and avoid violence against persons was also followed.
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Similar patterns of independently planned and executed protest tactics appear in the 
protest campaigns against G7/G8 and G20 meetings in Germany14 as well as ones 
against the financial industry and neoliberal capitalism in Frankfurt/Main. Excepting 
the protests against the 2015 G7 meeting, these campaigns were partially marked by 
the use of violent actions by actors on the radical left. In line with previously given 
examples, not to mention numerous studies of social movements, this division is not 
unusual. In preparation processes, moderate groups not only engage in the cumber-
some negotiations about planning, financing, and public performances but also some-
times arrive at an explicit Aktionskonsens or consensus for action, which underlines 
principles of nonviolence across collective action forms. More radical groups rarely 
participate in fleshing out a consensus for action. Rather, they prefer to stay outside or 
on the fringe of the coalition protests that come with action-constraints. When prepar-
ing their own protests, these groups rely on more circumscribed membership circles 
and, in line with an organizational form conducive to preventing surveillance but con-
trary to moderate alliances, often carry out separate protest actions (as seen in the 2017 
G20 protests in Hamburg). However, such groups occasionally participate in mass 
protests organized by moderate, mainstream groups without seeking prior consent. For 
good reason, the organizers of nonviolent protests fear the occurrence of violence, 
even when limited to a few activists, can lead to discrediting portrayals of the protest 
event as whole in the mass media (e.g., Teune, Sommer, & Rucht, 2017).
Alongside potential hurdles within and between groups in the field of activist 
organizations, organizers must also keep various state authorities and media actors in 
mind when determining the specifics of a mass street demonstration. Protest organizers 
negotiate with permitting authorities and the police to agree on the place of rally, the 
route of a march, and other specificities of their actions. They do so not only to gain 
access to the streets and possibly preempt any negative cooptation of their message by 
violent actors but also to better ensure they can protest where they can still disrupt business 
or politics as usual. In general, organizers try to protest close to meaningful targets (e.g., 
government buildings, banks, or the headquarters of large corporations) or places of 
symbolic meaning (e.g., the Brandenburg Gate), while authorities have little reason to 
open these spaces for collective action, especially when an escalation into violence or 
property damage is a concern. Activists’ dependence on the mass media to attain a 
broader audience, legitimacy, and some response creates a related set of difficulties for 
protest organizers. Gaining any media attention, which is largely based on contacts, 
disruption, novelty, and offering a good storyline, let alone coverage that will advance 
the goals of the protest requires consideration (see the media work section below). In 
short, journalists are likely to be attracted by some of the very same things (i.e., 
surprises) that can be bad news for organizers, delegitimize them, lead police to use 
force instead of negotiation, and undermine future mass mobilization work.
Consensus and Action Mobilization
Some people take part in a mass protest for contingent reasons like spending time with 
a friend who is participating, curiosity, or the chance to take a few photos with the 
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newly bought camera. But the larger share of participants join because they deem the 
issue and related claims important enough to take a public stand. They do so on the 
basis of moral and political values, personal beliefs and convictions, cognitive assess-
ments, and emotions. The individual or collectively arrived at decision to engage in 
protest is usually the result of longer process that, for analytical purposes, can be 
divided into consensus mobilization and action mobilization (Klandermans, 1984).
As Klandermans and Oegema (1987, p. 529) note, “The intention to participate is 
by no means a sufficient condition” for subsequent action. To use a metaphor, consensus 
mobilization means preparing the soil and planting the seed for potential action. More 
concretely, it conceptualizes the intentional effort of people with a distinct position on 
an issue to convince other people to adopt this position—to agree and form a consensus 
that this position is the right one. This effort implies targeting particular social groups 
or the public at large in order to raise awareness and to problematize a situation, 
process, or decision so that the addressees come to share the perspective of the mobilizers 
and adopt the framing of the issue. With regard to a forthcoming protest event, 
processes of consensus mobilization are an integral part of creating supporters and 
sympathizers. Particularly relevant when new issues arise without sparking an immediate 
outcry, the seeds of consensus mobilization can either be planted years ahead of time 
and easily adapted to the change organizers are seeking or organizers will need to 
mobilize consensus to produce the basis for mass action.
Action mobilization, as the term itself indicates, is the process of motivating people 
to engage in action. In our case, it means convincing people to take part in a mass 
protest. Action does not automatically follow from successful consensus mobilization. 
Rather, it depends on a range of additional conditions. People have to be convinced 
that the proposed action is meaningful, necessary, timely, and can be effective. 
Ultimately, successfully mobilizing actors to take action implies the removal of barriers 
to participation (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). Some barriers are more substantive 
(e.g., they fear reprisals, cannot identify with the group, or feel the claims are too 
extreme). Other barriers are more mundane (e.g., the effort of traveling to the protest 
location, bad weather, or alternatively tempting ways to spend their time). Accordingly, 
people engaged in action mobilization try to motivate potential participants by, among 
other things, dramatizing the problem, highlighting its relevance, announcing stirring 
speakers, making the event fun, or offering opportunities to cater the event to more 
personalized messages or forms of action.
The communication channel organizers’ select plays an important role in the 
numeric (participant) outcomes of action mobilization. Success rates tend to be relatively 
high when large organizations make a concerted effort to mobilize their own members 
via their conventional means of communication (newsletters, e-mail lists, assemblies, 
etc.). By contrast, they tend to be low when an unfamiliar group places a paid adver-
tisement in a newspaper. Along similar lines, creating the sense that the event is serious, 
that the organizers can be trusted, and that it will produce some results is a powerful 
element in action mobilization.
Contrary to Olson’s (1965) theory that people will not take action if they know they 
can simply benefit from the labor of others taking action—that they will take a free 
Rucht 1695
ride—the expectation that the protest will be huge serves as a magnet rather than a 
deterrent for participation. In such cases, action mobilization becomes a nearly auto-
catalytic process in which positive signals trigger still more positive signals. On the 
other hand, when organizers register sluggish reactions to their call for action, they 
may intensify their mobilizations efforts by adding communication channels, investing 
more money in publicity, and/or modifying the form of action to make it more 
attractive.
The concept of action mobilization predicts it will work best when the target groups 
are addressed by several channels of information and receive consistent messages that 
resonate with personal experiences, identities, or concerns. Ideally, direct communica-
tion from trusted peers and friends will complement mass media accounts. Today, in 
the era of digital communication that intensifies the strong and weak ties of social 
networks, both elements can be combined. Still, the significance of newer channels of 
communication should not be overestimated. Organizers specialized in using old and 
new media formats agree that conventional means of communication—flyers, leaflets, 
posters, advertisement in newspapers, and cinema spots—continue to be effective 
tools of action mobilization.
Media Work
Over the past two decades, media work (or public relations) has become an increas-
ingly crucial task for protest organizers. In large protest preparation processes, a sub-
group within the broader organizational network is created to deal specifically with 
media work (when needed and when resources permit). This group usually comprises 
three to four people with experience doing media work in large formal organizations 
(mostly environmental organization, trade unions, welfare organization, etc.). In the 
advent of major protests, the media group issues several press releases and also 
organizes one or more press conferences. As media outlets provide some of biggest 
public front stages, which coalition representatives should serve on the panel at key 
press conferences immediately before or after the event is a matter of debate—a debate 
typically that concludes in sending spokespeople from the most powerful organiza-
tions that often have more people familiar with speaking to the press. The organizational 
experts who deal with the mass media also establish relationships with some journalists. 
In return, certain journalists become familiar with or sympathetic to the cause of the 
group’s activities and therefore may receive privileged background information on the 
protest from their contact.
The design of public appearances, or “the arts of impression management” 
(Goffman, 1959), is closely related to media work. When it comes to designating 
speakers for the protest stage, selection criteria are not only about organizational 
affiliation and audience appeal but also about attractiveness to mass media actors. The 
wording of joint claims, slogans, and flyers (beyond the more specific materials 
offered by individual organizations) is similarly considered in light of possible mass 
media reactions. For example, in the wording of materials for mass protest events 
co-organized by big environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, BUND, or 
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Nabu, explicit references to “capitalism” are taboo even if the term is common 
parlance for internal, prep stage conversations. Related to these sensitive issues is the 
effort to maintain a specific organizational image when part of a broader network 
(much as corporations work to maintain their “corporate” image amid competitors or 
protestors). Greenpeace Germany, for example, was eager to distinguish its trademark 
in the first decades of its existence. Therefore, it was reluctant to engage in close, 
formal alliances with other environmental groups. As recognizable as many brands, 
Greenpeace’s preference for complete autonomy and distinctiveness diminished and it 
became willing to partner with other advocacy or activist organizations. Still, there are 
limits according to the issue, the form of protest, and the types of collectivities affiliated 
with the event. Greenpeace will not participate in joint actions cosponsored by for-
profit corporations (even if they are engaged in the renewable energy sector) or 
influenced by political parties (such as the Greens, the Social Democrats, or Die 
Linke).
Media work often raises questions of a more principled nature. For instance, is it 
worth the risk to rely more on conventional mass media and their selection and description 
biases? Or should one invest in media the protest groups can more fully control? 
Should an event coalition be authentically transparent, revealing internal tensions, or 
craft the image of a unified, coherent front? Is it possible to demonstrate in ways that 
will appeal to the media and a broader public as well as effectively threaten political 
insiders (Turner, 1969)? Should one serve mass media’s demand for personalization, 
celebrities, catchy phrases, sound bites, and spectacular pictures? In sum, how much 
investment should go into the front stage, public appearance, and how much should 
this be tailored to gaining mass media attention and possibly support?
Movement–media relations are fairly conventionalized in Germany (and much like 
the United States). More moderate, large, and professionalized groups tend to use 
multiple means of communication, including conventional media where they receive 
a relative fair shake. Radical groups rely more on their own communication channels 
because they have more difficulties attaining mainstream media access and coverage 
that is not marginalizing or discrediting. These groups, generally with few financial 
resources, use relatively cheap web-based communication, including the cross-
national Indymedia platform. In exceptionally large campaigns, such as the protest 
against the G8 meeting in 2007, the more radical segment of protest groups set up two 
temporarily existing Independent Media Centers that were meant to compensate for 
the perceived gaps and biases of the official messages from organizers of the summit, 
press officers of the police, and mainstream media (Rucht & Teune, 2008, Zimmer, 
2008). On this occasion, some left-leaning and liberal press made use of the “alterna-
tive” sources and the conservative press segment mainly ignored them. Other cases, 
however, present a different picture. For instance, in the 2010 iteration of the human 
chain repertoire the informal press group, which I had a chance to watch, was flooded 
with requests of information and interviews by all kinds of established media.15 
Movement research offers conflicting advice to activists about how to best get their 
messages out, but remains convinced that savvy media relations, savvy ways of 
catering to media routines can pay off.
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During and After the Protest Event
Suffice it to say that even when previous steps in the preparatory process were 
meticulously thorough and adaptable, the challenges on the day of the actual mass 
protest are often hard to pin down. Counter-protesters may block access roads to the 
site of protest, police may impose on-the-spot restrictions, an eminent speaker may 
drop out, the sound system may not work properly, and radical factions may resort to 
violence and thereby change not only the course of the event but also the way it is 
perceived. In light of such experiences, organizers try their best to reduce or rule out 
such surprises by preparing to handle various potential scenarios in advance. Although 
a detailed discussion of common organizational tasks arising at the event is beyond the 
scope of this article, two of the main issues organizers are likely to consider are 
described.
A central contingency is the turnout. Despite this consideration, actual participation 
can be significantly lower than expected and therefore undermine the returns on 
investment (financial and otherwise). While an overestimated turnout does not equate 
with failure, it can have myriad negative repercussions—for coalition solidarity, media 
coverage, influence, morale, and so on. In other cases, mobilization acquires a positive 
dynamics in the final days leading up to the event so that the organizers are over-
whelmed by the scope of attendance. This happened to organizers throughout Europe 
and beyond when they called to protest against the imminent war in Iraq on February 
15, 2003.16 Here again, wrongly anticipating the turnout surely does not equate with 
failure, but it may strain relations with permitting authorities, dilute carefully crafted 
messages about ways to solve the targeted problem, and generally create problems 
down the road in terms of long-term strategic aims.
Another key issue is that the end of the event does not mean the work of the 
organizers has come to an end. Requests for interviews remain to be answered, false 
accusations have to be addressed, an evaluative press conference may be held, and 
bills must be paid. In some instances, ones that are most certainly a nightmare for the 
organizers, a financial deficit or loan has to be compensated for in the weeks following 
the protest. Additionally, if disruptive actions occurred as a result of conflict escalation 
or as part of deliberately planned acts of civil disobedience, or if police went beyond 
the range of legal action, a subgroup of organizers dealing with juridical matters may 
need to take action. This can create event-related activities lasting for years after the 
event. It is also very likely that such a subgroup will seek the cooperation of permanent 
legal-aid groups, such as the Rechtshilfebüro Hamburg (Bureau for Legal Assistance), 
whose lawyers specialize in helping defendants or in indicting police officers for 
misbehavior.
Summary and Conclusions
As the preceding discussion makes clear, organizing a mass street protest is a multifaceted 
challenge that, in most cases, requires intense, laborious, and sophisticated preparation. 
Unlike the protest event itself, these earlier processes take place behind the scenes. 
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That is, they are rarely in the spotlight not only of the mass of protesters but also of 
journalists and, more astonishingly, social scientists studying political protest and 
social movements.
In this article, I have tried to shed some light on what I refer to as the prep stage of 
preparatory work. In my efforts to flesh out a framework for these preparatory 
processes, I identify a set of basic tasks and challenges that are neither mutually exclusive 
nor arise in a neat chronological order but can be parsed into steps or stages of sorts. I 
have illustrated the tasks within these steps with examples almost exclusively from the 
German protest sector. Nevertheless, they are by no means limited to this country. This 
assessment is based in my familiarity with social movement protest event research in 
other countries, witnessing mass demonstrations in other countries, and having inter-
viewed, on three occasions, core organizers of such events in Brazil, Greece, and, most 
recently at the March for Science in April 2017, in Washington, D.C.
In a final attempt to speak to the generalizability of my observations and insights, I 
underscore three aspects of planning and enacting mass street demonstrations that 
demand greater scrutiny. First, there is no single pattern in the ways to prepare mass 
protests. Protests of a similar form, say a stationary mass gathering at a public place 
with a similar number of participants, may be based on strikingly different structures. 
On the one hand, such an event can be the result of a relatively short preparation pro-
cess based on voluntary work and without much financial investment. On the other 
hand, a mass protest can rest on a preparatory period of a year or more, involving 
dozens of groups and organizations, the employment of five or more full-timers 
designed just for this task. Two examples show some of this variation. One is a stationary 
mass rally involving a costly material infrastructure: a big stage, a powerful sound 
system, and two or three large video screens. The other is a volunteer-intensive, low-
cost human chain in which a hundred thousand people link to symbolic places (e.g., 
two nuclear reactors).
Second, the relatively rare cases of radical leftist groups staging mass protest 
appear to lack an elaborated organizing structure. While this is possibly due to a lack of 
financial and other resources, we also simply know less about the prep stage for these 
protests because of the closeness of organizing circles and their fear of surveillance 
by intelligence services. As outsiders we can only see the calls for action placed on 
the Internet, in the radical press, and, more rarely, on posters presented in the late 
stage of mobilization. With these strikingly different cases in mind, we must be careful 
about sweeping generalizations about the requirements and processes of preparing 
mass protest.
Third, in spite of the previous caveats, it seems safe to identify some general 
trends in mass protest preparation over the past few decades. One trend is the 
gradual accumulation of not only organizational experience but also mutual recog-
nition and trust within the moderate spectrum of protest groups. They know about 
each other’s strengths and weaknesses as well as with whom it is easy or difficult 
to work with and on which grounds. These protest entrepreneurs also know the dif-
ficulties cooperating with the more radical groups can present, and vice versa, 
including the fact that both sets of actors conventionally act independently from 
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one another. Interestingly, this increasing degree of mutual estrangement led to the 
1999 formation of the Interventionistische Linke, an informal network of left 
radicals who want to overcome the isolation of activism at the left margin. To do 
so, the network attempts to bridge the ideological and organizational gaps between 
moderates and radicals by embracing, for example, the broader idea and practice of 
civil disobedience.
Another broad trend is the expansion and solidification of a general infrastructure 
beyond single issues and their respective protests and protest campaigns. Elements of 
this overarching infrastructure are evident in progressive media groups (e.g., 
Indymedia), multi-issue campaign groups (e.g., Campact), individuals and groups spe-
cializing in moderate protest methods by providing counseling and training for non-
violent action, progressive research groups and think tanks (some associated with 
foundations related to leftist parties), as well as financial institutions such as the multi-
issue Bewegungsstiftung (Movement Foundation) and the feminist foundation, filia, 
which support protest groups. This more encompassing and durable infrastructure 
serves as an additional layer of organizational fabric for channeling resources to issue-
specific protests and larger campaigns.
Taken together, these trends point to an increasing degree of overlap between 
the prep stage and the deeper movement infrastructure. More specifically, leaving 
aside the outlier cases of mass public outcry to triggering events followed by 
imminent mass action and Internet-aided actions that occur at high frequency but 
involve smaller participant numbers at each event, the overall trajectory in the 
orchestration of large-scale protest over the past few decades is toward greater 
routinization, professionalization, sophistication, and, relatedly, a growing division 
of labor. This tendency affects all basic organizational tasks. However, it is most 
apparent in putting together a core group of organizers, broadening the number 
and spectrum of supporters in the processes of mesomobilization, public relations, 
and providing scientific and judicial advice. When considering the German case, 
there are strong indicators for the establishment, growth, and refinement of what, 
in a perspective of admiration or a critical attitude, has been called a protest industry. 
However, the focus on this “industry” should not make us oblivious to the fact that 
the great bulk of protests (if not participant number) are small and medium-sized, 
resting on relatively modest preparatory work, voluntary engagement, and little if 
any financial investment.
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Notes
 1. The mobilization to protest against the meeting of the IMF and World Bank in Berlin in 
1988 started 2 years before the meeting. At least 136 different groups were involved in the 
process, and 417 publicly announced meetings were registered (Gerhards, 1993).
 2. Out of the 1,653 protest events in Germany I identified using the daily newspaper die tag-
eszeitung from 2010 to 2015, 144 events had at least 20,000 participants. When excluding 
signature collecting, petitions, and strikes, 58 protests (or 3.5% of all events) of the 144 
were rallies and marches. Based on examining the same source from 1993 to 2009, I found 
that of the 11,139 protests in total, 366 events included at least 20,000 participants. A total 
of 185 of these large-scale protests (1.7% of all events) were marches or rallies. Comparing 
the two time periods suggests an increasing proportion of big marches and rallies over 
time.
 3. Probably mainly for pragmatic reasons, several researchers focus on protests of at least 
10,000 participants because these protests also make up the bulk of participants overall 
(Biggs, 2016). Still, it remains arbitrary whether to set the threshold for “mass protests.”
 4. This metaphor was popularized by Erving Goffman, who, mainly with regard to perfor-
mances of individuals, distinguished between “front stage,” “back stage,” and “off stage” 
(Goffman, 1959).
 5. Similar observations were made in the coalition protesting against the WTO meeting in 
Seattle in 1999 (see Levi & Murphy, 2006).
 6. Campact, established in 2005, was inspired by the U.S.-based group MoveOn. It engages 
in a broad number and range of issues.
 7. To give another example, only 2 weeks after the nuclear accident in Fukushima, the anti-
nuclear movement in Germany, relying on its preexisting infrastructure and experience, 
managed to organize mass rallies in four cities on March 26, 2011. According to the orga-
nizers, around 250,000 people participated in these rallies in total. The investment, relative 
to size of the events, was relatively low at several ten thousands of Euros.
 8. This human chain was proposed—without the support of more established groups who 
doubted the likelihood of successful mobilization—by the key organizers of the antinu-
clear network ausgestrahlt. This network financed just two people to work full-time over 
several weeks to launch the campaign. Volunteers and activists mainly based in the region 
the human chain was crossing, however, did the lion’s share of the preparatory work. On 
the German side, the local newspaper Aachener Tageszeitung was extremely supportive in 
the mobilization process by devoting one full page to the topic every week for each of the 
10 weeks prior to the protest.
 9. In Berlin, both the organizers and the police gave an estimate of 70,000 protest-
ers—a number that the observation group of which I was part found far too high 
(our account was 30,000 protesters at maximum; see https://protestinstitut.eu/
zahlenspiele-wie-viele-haben-demonstriert).
10. Big organizations such as the BUND and Greenpeace Germany had a budget of 49 and 58 
million Euros, respectively, in 2015.
11. Consider a case involving the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) environmental group. 
When asked by other environmental organizations to cover its share of the expenses of a 
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planned protest, the WWF representative argued that allowing the use of the WWF logo 
(something other actors or institutions usually have to pay for) already constituted a finan-
cial contribution. To the dismay of the other groups, the WWF was not ready to make a 
more concrete financial commitment.
12. Campact’s budget was about 6.5 million Euros in 2015.
13. Alternatively, each left political party may be invited to send a speaker.
14. Major protests were staged at the occasion of the G7 meeting in coastal location 
Heiligendamm in June 2007 (see Rucht & Teune, 2008; Teune, 2012), the G8 meeting in 
the Bavarian Elmau in June 2015, and the G20 meeting in Hamburg in July 2017.
15. At least a dozen of mostly young people sat around a large table in an office room in 
Hamburg. Each was equipped with a computer and some with a telephone and headset. 
They were kept busy for hours reacting to media requests in, according to my impression, 
a highly professional and effective way.
16. At this occasion, around 500,000 people attended the rally in Berlin. Turnout on this day 
was much greater in a few other places, such as Rome and Barcelona, where an estimated 
3 million and 1.3 million, respectively, took part (Verhulst, 2010). Many participants, 
approaching from various directions, could not even manage to get within sight of the 
stage.
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